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Abstract: We compare international best practice guidelines on Social Impact Assessment  with
current  practices  in  Vietnam,  based  on  a  desk  review  of  relevant  regulations;  participative
observation; stakeholder interviews and three exemplary hydropower project cases. We find that
infrastructure  development  is  booming  in  Vietnam  despite  administrative  complexity  and
inefficiencies;  resettlement  for  hydropower  projects  has  become a  kind  of  lightning  rod for
questions of environmental justice in Vietnamese society; compensation is the key issue there;
overshadowing other  social  impact  considerations.  Options to improve the investment of  all
stakeholders in the social impact assessment and management are discussed.
1. Introduction
Infrastructure development is a necessary condition for economic growth and modernization.
Globally, between 7 to 10 per cent of Gross National Product is invested in infrastructure. In a
fast  developing  country  like  Vietnam,  the  percentage  is  even  higher.  Costs  to  people  and
ecosystems match this scale. Throughout history, in all countries, millions of people have been
displaced to make way for roads, water canals, and dams. Indirect impacts from projects such as
real estate speculation modify access to natural resources and environmental pollution further
escalates their impact.
Hydropower, once put forward as essential to modernization, continues to play an important role
in  low  carbon  clean  energy  development.  Hydropower  is  a  low  CO2 emissions  source  of
electricity, it does not rely on imported fuels and it can be turned on and off to follow demand
--unlike solar  and wind.  In  recent  years it  has drawn considerable criticism for  its  negative
impact on people and environment. WWF (2004) puts it simply: “Dams are both a blessing and a
curse”.  Large  dams  destroy  ecosystems,  impacting  wetlands  and  freshwater  species,  while
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economic benefits  are  not  necessarily distributed justly,  but  rather  mostly to  developers and
investors.
As a means of navigating the complicated process of balancing benefits of large infrastructure
projects  against  costs,  governments  and  international  funding  organizations  require
Environmental and Social Impact Assessments (ESIA). In an ideal world, only projects with
compliant  ESIA would  be  funded,  and  this  would  guarantee  acceptable  impacts.  Reality
checking  reveals  some important  impediments  and inefficiencies,  among  them a  significant
problem of good faith. Almost  all  ESIA reports conform to the language of regulations. Yet
failed resettlement or biodiversity losses issues still exist.
There is still no coherent mechanism for sharing the learning from ESIA across communities of
practice or sectors of industry, resulting in the repetition of mistakes and inadequate pressure on
ongoing  and  future  projects  to  improve.  Discussing  the  impacts  of  the  Sesan  river  dam in
Cambodia, Sangha and Bunnarith (2006) observe, for example, “The Sesan issue highlights the
learned water governance lessons in the Mekong Region, yet shows how these learned lessons
continue to be ignored.” Furthermore, a substantial amount of research literature on ESIA is
project specific, and contributes little to understanding how to improve ESIA systematically. 
Another large share of ESIA-related studies are interested in environmental rather than social
impact, resulting in an incomplete analysis of human-environment interactions. For example, the
most  popular  on-line  database  of  scientific  literature  returns  81  100  results  for  dam
“environmental impact” versus only 13 700 results for dam “social impact” (accessed 2015-09-
18). In an effort to address the need for a more thorough analysis of infrastructure impact, we
chose to focus on the social dimension. 
Previous research suggests that resettlement —the economic and/or physical displacement of
people— is the main social issue for many projects.  While most large infrastructure projects
have to resettle some people to ensure effective implementation, the problem is especially acute
for  hydroelectricity  projects.  Thus,  hydropower  projects  are  of  particular  interest  in
understanding how regulations attempt to mitigate the impact of resettlement and how effective
these guidelines are to what happens on the ground.
Having examined the costs and risks of hydropower dams in Vietnam, Tu et al. (2013) concluded
that “Regarding the costs for resettlement, it seems that citizens are generally worse off after
resettlement. The Government of Vietnam has implemented the ‘land-for-land’ policy in land
confiscation practices since the 1990s, including those for hydropower projects. However, in
many cases, compensated land provided is less in quantity and worse in quality than the land
that was taken. The compensation and support is insufficient for resettled people to conduct the
same agricultural practices as on their former land. People have become poorer than before
resettlement.”  Huu  (2015)  noted  that  “To  date,  approximately  200,000  people  have  been
displaced and relocated for  the construction of  hydroelectric dams,  of  which over  90% are
ethnic minorities. The majority of resettled people have no stable life after resettlement, and
their living standards are increasingly more difficult than before resettlement. In practice, very
few cases of  resettlement due to hydropower dam construction are considered as successful
examples in Vietnam.”
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So in spite of a robust set of guidelines attached to Vietnamese infrastructure projects, evidence
on social impact remains a cause for concern. Is reduced wealth and quality of life an inevitable
result of resettlement? Are there concrete, actionable ways of mitigating loss and even improving
livelihoods,  as  the  guidelines  imply? With these questions  in  mind,  we have undertaken an
analysis of international best practice guidelines/ESIA compared to current practices in Vietnam,
looking  specifically  for  which  characteristics  constitute  barriers  to  sustainable  infrastructure
development and which allow infrastructure projects to minimize damaging effects to people and
environment while achieving the best balance between development goals and costs.
2. Method and observations
This reporting is based on 1) a desk review of relevant regulations 2) our first-hand experience
as consultants tasked with implementation for various hydropower and expressway projects and
3) interviews with international lending organization officers, impacted persons and consultants
4) three hydropower project cases discussed in section 3.
2.1. ESIA in theory: the guidelines
Environmental and social impact assessments are, as their name indicates, assessment tools for
evaluating the impact of projects on ecosystems or environments, and people (Morgan, 2012).
The data contained within them informs decisions on the viability and potential consequences of
infrastructure and other types of development.
The International Association for Impact Statement (IAIA) defines ESIA as:
The process of identifying, predicting, evaluating and mitigating the biophysical,  social,  and
other  relevant  effects  of  development  proposals  prior  to  major  decisions  being  taken  and
commitments made. (IAIA 1999)
The first  source  of  guidelines  defining  what  these  ESIA should  contain  is  national  law.  In
Vietnam, the Environmental Protection Law of 2005 (art. 18) requires Environmental Impact
Assessment (EIA) for projects of national importance or those having potential risks or adverse
impacts on the environment. Although these EIA do not include “Social impact” as a distinct
category, the law (art. 20) provides that assessments should contain opinions of the municipal-
level People's Committees and representatives of population communities in the place where the
project  is  located,  including  unfavorable  opinions.  The  law (art.  21)  also  states  that  before
making  conclusions  or  decisions,  EIA  appraisal  councils  must  consider  petitions  or
recommendations  sent  in  by  organizations,  population  communities  and  individuals.
Government’s Decree 69/2009/ND-CP and Decree No. 197/2004/ND-CP frame the role of local
administrations: “basing themselves on local realities, the provincial-level People’s Committee
presidents shall decide on other supporting measures to stabilize life and production of persons
who have land recovered”.
International regulations constitute an additional level of rules governing the impact assessment
of large infrastructure projects in Vietnam.  Between 2010-2014, Vietnam ranked third highest in
the amount of external aid received (OECD, 2015). Over 40% of infrastructure investment in the
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country is financed from external sources. With foreign funding comes a system of oversight
intended  to  assess  a  project’s  adherence  to  the  funding  organization's  development  goals.
Regulations  for  oversight  and  reporting  are  meant  to  improve  the  likelihood  of  sustainable
outcomes.
The major external funding sources for infrastructure in Vietnam include the World Bank, the
Asian  Development  Bank  (ADB),  Japan’s  JICA,  Germany’s  KfW/GTZ,  and  France’s  AFD.
Climate  finance organizations,  from the ailing Clean Development Mechanism to the newly
created Green Climate Fund fund are also involved in hydropower. Each organization has its
own  preferred  domain  of  intervention  regarding  the  size,  geographic  location  and  type  of
projects supported. There is also variety in the financial structure and in the conditions attached
to funding. However, these agencies all require some form of ESIA to be conducted prior to
large project approval (ADB 2009, WB 2001, JICA 2010).
For example, according to current World Bank procedures, the Bank must satisfy itself that the
borrower has explored all  viable alternative project designs to avoid involuntary resettlement
and, when it is not feasible to avoid resettlement, to minimize its scale and impacts, such as
through the realignment of roads or reduction in the height of dams. The World Bank’s current
involuntary resettlement policy presupposes that the project justifies the evictions or restrictions
of access to resources and does not contain a requirement to first  assess whether the project
promotes the general welfare.
Although there has been progress in reforming national systems, there are still significant gaps
between requirements and guidelines of various development partners (government, ministries,
local  agencies,  international  banks,  other  countries’  development  agencies)  which  require
harmonization. The gaps between the environmental and social impact assessment guidelines
given by international funding organizations and current practices in the country can lead to
unintended and/or unsustainable outcomes.
2.2. ESIA processes and practices
Large infrastructure projects involve private actors, central ministries and local administrations.
Proper design is critical to minimizing impact. Private actors in charge of the detailed design
determine project scope --it is their expertise and ways of working that drive a project in its early
stages. The design consultant is usually a consortium led by one main consultant with many sub-
consultants. The main consultant is selected according to the nature of the infrastructure, e.g. to
build a  highway one  would  hire  those with  experience in  road and bridge engineering;  for
hydropower plants,  design consultants with experience in dam and power plants are chosen.
Expertise in social and environmental domains is not a primary criteria. The main consultant
generally contracts out the EIA to a sub-consultant, who in turn may subcontract out the social
assessment portion.
On the government  side,  planning and development  of  large projects  involve the  following
ministries:
● Prime Minister - Approval of development orientation 
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● Ministry of Construction (MoC) - Line Ministry for urban development 
● Ministry  of  Planning  and  Investment  (MPI)  -  Allocates  state  budget.  All  major
investment  projects  must  have  approval  of  MPI.  Prepares  Social  Economic
Development Plan 
● Ministry of Natural Resources and Environment (MonRE) - Manages water resources,
water use, pollution and is in charge of land use planning. 
● Ministry of Finance (MoF) - Distributes state funds to sectors and projects, sets annual
sector goals and regulates accounting 
The  coordination  of  official  development  assistance  (ODA)  projects  follows  a  top-bottom
approach with MPI being the focal  point,  Ministry of Finance being the official  contractual
"borrower”, and the branch Ministries or Line Agencies acting as state supervisors of operational
implementation. The MoF, on behalf of Government of Vietnam, borrows funds from donors and
development banks, which have their own specific financial conditions and technical policies.
Then MoF either allocates the funds to the project implementing agencies through state treasury
(for  projects  that  do not  bring future  revenue),  or  re-lends the funds through the Viet  Nam
Development Bank (for projects that generate revenue in the future).
Projects involve many layers of responsible agencies at the national, provincial and municipal
levels.  The  People’s  Committees  at  the  provincial  and  city  levels  in  general  have  limited
capacity  in  carrying  out  ODA  projects,  lacking  familiarity  with  procedures  in  project
administration  and  management  best  practice.  Local  governments  have  little  experience  of
mobilizing  sources  of  funds  other  than  central  government  transfers  (Tr n  Ti p  Đ  2012).ầ ế ệ
Though they have final  control  on project  implementation,  their  standards  and methods can
differ from those of international funders, and consequently the building may differ from the
approved design in problematic ways (Ph m Tuyên-Ng c S n 2015, MONRE 2011). On theạ ọ ơ
other hand, funders can also lack sufficient knowledge and involvement at the ground level of
implementation,  thereby  lacking  a  clear  picture  of  how  infrastructure  building  is  actually
affecting people and ecosystems. 
The ESIA process is designed to inform “prior to major decisions being taken.” In practice,
though, the time line of ESIA studies and their influence on project approval is anything but
straightforward or transparent.
Many development projects that require acquisition of land or natural  resources will  resettle
local communities prior to project implementation. The Phu Lac Wind Park in the Binh Thuan
province,  supporting  agency  KfW from  Germany,  illustrates  this.  Its  feasibility  study  was
approved in January 2010, but it took three years to sign the loan. Resettlement and other tasks
like road construction and unexploded ordnance clearing were therefore conducted before the
loan was granted. A three year delay is a long exposure to exchange rate fluctuations, given that
wind farm projects are usually physically constructed in less than a year. The delay in this case
can be explained by the fact that this was the first wind farm ESIA performed in the country.
Donor oversight was very present in this case. 
5
We have seen other cases where resettlement and displacement have occurred in anticipation of
donor involvement for the specific reason of avoiding compliance with donor safeguard policies.
Many  development  projects  that  require  acquisition  of  land  or  natural  resources  will  cause
resettlement  or  displacement  during  a  period  prior  to  implementation  of  the  project.  For
example,  families  in  Tay  Ho  district,  Hanoi  have  been  threatened  to  remove  houses  for  a
resettlement project though no legal decision had been issued yet (ĐCSVN 2015).
After a project has been authorized, public services have less leverage to make the developer
deal with the problems of impacted persons and environment. There is generally less supervision
by authorities once a project is in operation.
3. Examples of social impact management stories
This section exposes three contrasting cases of hydropower social impact management coming
from different  parts  of  Vietnam. The first  is  funded by a Japanese bank and thus bound by
domestic guidelines, the second and third follow WB and ADB donor policies.
3.1. Srepok 4A hydropower project
Description: Electricity generation utilizing the water from the discharge channel of Srepok 4
Hydropower Project upstream. Total installed capacity 64 MW, no dam or reservoir, see Figure
1 (at the end of this manuscript).
Dates: Start date Oct, 2010. Commissioning of the first unit on 25/12/2013
Location: Ea Huar, Ea Wer and Krông Na communes, Buôn Đôn district, Đăk Lăk province,
Vietnam. Coordinates 12.8934412, 107.8116228.
Funding: Commercial loan from Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corporation (Japan) under Non-
binding Foreign Credit Insurance Program of Nippon Export and Investment Insurance (NEXI),
guaranteed by Vietnamese Government.
A look at  Srepok 4A reveals  many examples  of  complications  inherent  in  conducting  large
infrastructure building (damage to livelihoods and property, pollution, dislocation).
Project documents (EIA report, resettlement plan) for Srepok 4A were prepared in compliance
with Vietnamese regulations. In the EIA, impact on water supply for the part of Srepok river
extending from the dam of Srepok 4 to Srepok 4A’s powerhouse was considered adequate to
ensure the water supply for cultivation and tourism. However, the actual situation did not match
the ESIA calculation.
Water diversion for the project caused a lack of water in a part of the river upstream of the
powerhouse and has had a negative impact on Buon Don village (a tourist destination, close to
the Yok Don national park). The waterfall and river at the site have dried out and hence become
much less attractive to tourists. This causes serious problems for people dependent on tourism
for a living. 
6
The construction and existence of a water diversion channel for the powerhouse was thought to
make communication and transportation more difficult. To resolve this issue the project owner
built some bridges. However, during construction, people complained that the bridges were of
low quality and unsafe.  A group of about 50 gathered to prevent the construction of the plant,
after which the local authority decided to postpone the bridge construction for review and safety
checks. Finally, during construction, the water diversion channel was broken due to heavy rain,
flooding land used for cultivation by local people.
Other problems included complaints about inadequate compensation, damage to houses from
construction (cracks in walls, broken windows), pollution from solid wastes and floods.  
On the positive side, farmers whose land was damaged were able to learn about their property
rights for the first time and get legal aid for the right compensation.
3.2. Trung Son dam
Description:  the  260  MW Trung  Son  Hydropower  Plant  is  a  multipurpose  project  (power
generation, flood regulation, CO2 emission reduction). More Information including the SEIA
report is available at http  ://  trungsonhp  . vn  /
Location: Ma River and has its project site in Thanh Hoa, Son La and Hoa Binh province.
Funder: World Bank
Dates: expected to operate on QIV 2016.
Reports  regarding  environmental  and  social  impact  assessment,  livelihood  for  indigenous
people, etc were prepared in accordance with WB regulations. All documents are available on
the websites of project owner and WB.
The  Trung  Son  project  has  a  practical,  efficient  multi-layer  monitoring  and  evaluation
framework consisting of the following elements:
• Dam Safety Review Panel/Project Technical Advisory Panel (PTAP)
• Panel of Environmental and Social Experts (POE),
• Independent monitoring consultants (IMC),
• Regular supervision by staff of the World Bank.
It also has well-funded social and environmental impact mitigation programs, including the US
$28million spent for improvement of life and livelihoods of affected people and environmental
protection (with a total of over 50 packages related to environmental and social issues).
In terms of addressing the grievances of impacted people, project owner TSHPCo established a
detailed plan to ensure that all complaints related to compensation would be resolved quickly,
via  two  channels:  People’s  Committees  from  town  to  provincial  level  and  an  Independent
Grievance Panel setup by project owner.  The process of resolving complaints and claims only
ends  when  people  are  satisfied  with  the  outcome.  TSHPCo  has  its  own  website
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http  ://  www  . trungsonhp  . vn where  public  information  related  to  addressing  complaints  and
grievances is continuously updated.
3.3. Song Bung 4 dam
Description: Song Bung 4 is a run-of-river Hydropower Project with the total capacity of 156
MW.
Dates: first unit commissioned on 1/10/2014
Location: Vu Gia River, Quang Nam Province
Funding: Asian Development Bank
The  two  previous  examples  may  suggest  that  issues  related  to  resettlement  and  ensuring
livelihood for relocated people are better  addressed in internationally funded projects (ODA
from WB or ADB) than nationally funded ones. Indeed, international projects have to comply
with both VN regulations and sponsor's guidelines. With these guidelines and close supervision
from sponsors, the resettlement process has been significantly improved compared to that of VN
regulated projects. However, there are still some problems remaining.
For  example,  in  the  case  of  Song  Bung  4  (165MW,  ADB  funded  project   36352-013),
compensation was paid to affected households so they could build new houses themselves. This
was an effort to address the widespread problem seen in many other hydropower projects of
resettlement houses not meeting the needs of displaced people. However, when people received
large amounts of money at once, some spent it instead on more ornate wooden houses, buying
new transportation or other things unrelated to income generation. One unforeseen consequence
was the deforestation caused by the wooden house trend (VNTimes 2012).  By contrast,  the
Trung Son project avoided these problems because the World Bank required approval of house
designs before paying compensation.
Another issue is land for cultivation in the resettlement area. For Song Bung 4, each household
has 1.5ha as stated in approved plan,  but  people claimed that  this  was not  enough.  Beyond
resettlement,  social  impacts  included  claims  of  problem  with  illegal  workers  from  China
working for the project (Nguy n Thành 2013) and allegations that corrupt local officers liedễ
about the amount of property loss to steal compensation money (Văn Nguy n 2014).ễ
4. Results
4.1. Administrative complexity multiplies project complexity
The complexity of projects is a significant barrier to efficient impact assessments. Factors which
increase the difficulty of projects are:
● Projects have three working languages: Vietnamese, English and the language of the
country behind the international funding. In general, Official Development Assistance
projects require that the main consultant as well as main contractor be from donor’s
nationality.
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● Projects cover several towns or provinces. For example, the transfer of funds between
provinces and general  coordination requires time consuming processes at  the central
level.
● Projects cover sub sectors from different ministries. For example, different partners have
different rates for the backhanders envelopes, which are not easy to know.
● Projects have multiple donors.  For example,  the first  three lines of the Hanoi metro
under construction are each financed by a different country (China, Japan and France);
each requires the use of a national engineering company and national train provider. This
is not only a technical absurdity, it complicates the impact study for no reason.
Complexity  leads  to  delays  in  approval  and  start-up,  particularly  for  procurement  contracts,
thereby inhibiting the effective implementation of infrastructure projects. Social realities keep
changing during these delays. People move in and out, the economy grows (or shrinks), media
can take interest and increase visibility, bringing to light conflicts or problems. Years of delay
make the social assessment a moving target and considerably harder to reach. Long timelines
also make it easier to justify any discrepancies between the lowball estimates and the social
problems encountered. 
When the administrative system is too complex, it becomes inefficient. In the end, the role of the
State in the compensation of displaced people becomes weaker, leaving the project owner to
negotiate directly with impacted people.
Viet  Nam’s  rapid  economic  and  population  growth  has  led  to  a  multiplication  of  new
infrastructure  projects.  Smooth  administration  of  infrastructure  projects  needs  more  human
resources and institutional capacity to regulate, plan, operate, and manage infrastructure assets
and services (Pham, 2014).
4.2. Resettlement remains a major concern
Though the impact statement may appear to be a streamlined process, a closer look reveals some
important  challenges,  in  particular  in  the  area  of  involuntary  resettlement.  Development
guidelines call for resettlement that leaves people in “equal or better” conditions. But translating
that aim into concrete outcomes acceptable to affected people is anything but simple. Those
impacted by involuntary resettlement (IR) face a number of well-documented risks and human
rights  violations,  including  homelessness;  loss  of  livelihood;  food  insecurity;  psychological
trauma;  negative  health  impacts;  increased  morbidity  and  vulnerability,  especially  among
women  and  children;  economic  and  cultural  marginalization;  and  social  disintegration.  For
example:
● The land disputes between the government and people have tended to worsen when
farmers want to protect their land and assets. The forcibly evicted have been arrested,
beaten  or  even  worse.  On  25  April  2014,  Hanoi  authority  mobilized  “thousands  of
people” including gangsters and mafia in a coercive land acquisition in Duong Noi, Ha
Dong district - according to many witnesses (BBC Ti ng Vi t, 2014).ế ệ
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● In June 2012, holdout families clashed with a group of men hired to clear their land for
the EcoPark site,  leaving several villagers injured and others vowing to protect their
homes should demolition crews return in Van Giang, Hung Yen. (Mac Lam, 2012)
Resettlement  for  hydropower  projects  has  become  a  kind  of  lightning  rod  for  questions  of
environmental  justice  in  Vietnamese  society  (CPV,  2012).  IRs  are  often  viewed  as
discriminatory, as it is the poor and marginalized sections of the population, generally, who are
required to move out of the way for development projects. Impacts from displacement are not
constant across populations: dams are built  in mountainous areas and tend to affect the poor
disproportionately.  Those  living  in  remote  and  high  mountain  areas  have  less  access  to
education, higher dropout rates, later school enrollment, less access to formal financial services,
less productive land and less off-farm employment. On average, they have lower market access
and poorer returns from markets. The difference in material living conditions of households in
the deltas and those living in mountain areas is widening. The multi-ethnic makeup of Vietnam,
with over fifty distinct groups and languages, adds to the difficulties of assessing and managing
impact  on  these  people  and  communities.  (UNDP,  Poverty  Situation  Analysis  Of  Ethnic
Minorities in Vietnam 2007-2012).
4.3. Fair compensation, key to satisfaction but difficult to decide
Determining  what  is  fair  compensation  is  a  critical  facet  of  social  acceptability  of  large
infrastructure projects. According to government statistics, 70% of citizen complaints are related
to land disputes and many of them have remained in deadlock for a long time (VGP, 2015).
Although the law and guidelines define a unified compensation policy, in practice there is a
difference between urban and mountain areas. In the mountain areas, compensation is often land
for land. In the cities, impacted persons are offered more options. For example, they can be
offered  a  choice  among several  options:   a)  money;  b)  land for  land,  that  is  a  comparable
apartment or house in the resettlement area; or c) buying land at a preferential price in their
current neighborhood. One reason for this difference is that impacted persons in cities have a
stronger political voice. In the mountains, contested sites have less visibility, given that it can
take several days of travel for a journalist to visit.
The relation between the compensation amount and the market price of land is problematic,
complicated by the lack of professional agencies working on land price assessment. Land prices
issued by the government are not updated relative to changes in market price in some localities,
leaving resettled households at a disadvantage. In some cases. the land price announced by the
government is equivalent only to 30-60% of market price. (BBC News, 2012).
The Provincial People’s Committee has the authority to make decisions for both land price and
forced eviction. Due to the lack of specific guidance on the process of determining applicable
land prices, each province or city offers different solutions which may cause inequalities across
cases. In the vast majority of cases, the administrative decision was imposed and not in line with
market prices. Additionally, in many cases, compensation for resettlement is slow. (Gillespie and
al. 2015)
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Most people do not sign a formal contract agreeing to a compensation package. Thus, if they do
not  explicitly  complain,  they  are  assumed  to  be  satisfied.  Le  Chi  Cuong  (2014)  wrote  for
example  “According to assessment of the Consultant,  almost all  interviewed households are
satisfied  with  the  compensation  plan  that  the  Project  proposed.  Some  households  are  not
satisfied with the compensation price for land, crops or limit of support for agricultural land.
However, after considering and clarifying, PC of Gia Lai concludes that the compensation plan
for those households are totally in compliance with regulations of the State and PC of Gia Lai
province. After that, those households have received compensation and support as provided in
the approved compensation plan.” Yet even after compensation is taken, factors can impede the
sustainability of resettlement, and lead resettled households to eventually move back to their
previous land. 
4.4. Other social impacts beyond resettlement are little managed 
Comprehensive and independent  reports on Social  Impact  Assessment of large infrastructure
projects in Vietnam remain an exception today. Currently, SIA is typically included within EIA
reports and often accounts for a very superficial part, typically about 10% of the EIA content,
20% maximum. This is not enough space to adequately address all social aspects such as gender
issues, inequality or cultural heritage.
The ESIA we analysed focuses on emissions: how many tons of dust, SOx, NOx, how many dB
of  noise  level,  while  other  aspects  such  as  water  balance  changes,  deforestation,  aquatic
production and impact to cultural indigenous peoples are briefly described in only a few pages
(see  e.g.  Đoàn  Đ i  bi u  Qu c  H i  t nh  Phú  Yên  2013).  Most  of  the  EIA for  industrialạ ể ố ộ ỉ
development,  mining  and  urban  transportation  projects  we  reviewed  scarcely  addressed  the
forecasting of ecological and social impact and included very little information and data on local
diversity biology, ethnography, cultural heritage, or archeology in their reports. Yet disregarding
the  culture  of  the  impacted  households  can  lead  to  inappropriate  resettlement  attempts,  for
example by building flat houses for people who live on stilt houses.
One  reason  for  this  may  be  methodological.  Even  in  countries  with  the  most  advanced
universities and research institutions, there are still controversies on the capacity of science to
adequately  forecast  impacts  on  natural  ecosystems  or  human  systems.  There  is  a  risk  that
qualitative impacts, which are even harder to measure, are simply dropped out of the ESIA.
Guidelines have a key role to play here. They can go beyond the quantitative data of things like
CO2 measures to provide more explicit direction in employing the methods and tools of social
sciences with which most engineers are not familiar.
5. Discussion
5.1. Aligning the goals of process and outcome 
The ESIA must be acceptable to funding organisations and public supervisors. If there is an
unacceptable  environmental  and  social  issue,  either  the  project’s  execution  or  the  impact
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assessment has to be modified. This poses the problem of process overtaking substance, creating
situations where the studies are modified rather than the projects they are intended to inform.
Social impact assessment and social impact management are not  distinct processes;  they are
closely related. For example, the consultants who perform the ESIA may have to ask people if
they accept the proposed compensation. While they have a limited mandate, this is in fact an
intervention, not an observation. They can defer the unresolved issues to project owners, who
will negotiate further until resolution of the compensation question. In this example, it is the
project that is modified by adjusting the compensation. Details of the transactions may not be
discussed in the final ESIA report, which may only mention that there are no outstanding issues.
5.2. Mitigating the inherent conflict of interest with expertise
Problems  with  conflict  of  interest  in  the  ESIA process  have  begun  to  gain  more  attention
recently with increased emphasis on questioning the “neutral” nature of these technical guidance
documents (see for example Stoen et al, 2015).
Consultants are not independent experts. They are dis-incentivized to report negative impacts
which  may  delay  or  impede  project  approval,  affecting  their  pay.  Whistleblowing  also
jeopardizes future business. Even if the social impact subcontractor finds issues which may stop
the project, the report still has to go through the EIA subcontractor, the main consultant and the
project  owner  before  going  to  the  funding  organization.  Each  of  these  stages  opens  up
possibilities for modifying, removing or re-doing sections describing risks fatal to the project.
EIA/SIA reports are commissioned by project owners as required by both Vietnamese law and
donor guidelines. Investors and owners have an interest in exploiting any loopholes in the impact
estimation guidelines in order to foreground positive impacts, minimize negative outcomes and
downplay mitigation issues. This can happen in spite of the quality of experts and forecasting
technology, because there is always some scientific ambiguity in the subject matter. Most social
aspects are not easily captured in precise, deterministic quantified assessments.
One way to address  this  problem of  expertise  independence is  to  build upon the difference
between social and engineering/environmental aspects: subjects can be involved in dialectic, that
is a systematic reasoning, exposition, or argument that juxtaposes opposed or contradictory ideas
and seeks to resolve their conflict.  Counter-expertise capacity lies --or could be developed--
within  NGOs,  universities  and  other  community-based  practices  to  engage  in  the  types  of
collaborative knowledge production and learning called for in the literature (Duncan 2013).
5.3. Improving transparency and participation towards an ESIA 2.0
By definition, large infrastructure projects have a national interest, which may or may not align
with local interests. Thus, irrespective of the political situation in a given country, decisions on
infrastructure  development  often  challenge  democratic  processes.  They  are  undertaken  by
governments  and implemented  in  the  name of  higher  national  interests  by large public  and
private actors. Such projects are not ultimately decided by the affected people.
12
Instead, assessing affected persons’ needs and potential impact is accomplished through various
types  of  participation processes.  These participations  can range from very thorough ones  in
which projects seek to resolve affected persons’ concerns and co-construct the project before
proceeding, to those processes of merely informing people of what will be done, without leaving
them any choice as to the outcome.
Our research has shown that the ESIA process often remains “top down”, leaving affected or
displaced people with insufficient opportunity for substantive input. Publishing relevant project
information  to  the  widest  possible  audience  would  open up  more  possibilities  for  dialogue
around impact. Alan Potkin (2014) for example notes that aesthetic issues caused by the de-
watering  of  cascades  by  hydro  projects  in  the  Mekong  area  can  be  understood  better  by
interactive multimedia experiences than by traditional ESIA methods. Communication on social
platforms open to comments by all netizens has become common for all projects in Vietnam. 
There is a significantly different impact among project locations. People in urban areas have
wider access to public information, media and to the authorities than affected communities in
remote areas. Poor people, people in remote areas, less educated people and ethnic minorities
have little or no effective choice or decisional power. This should lead to different approaches to
Social Impact Assessment if the goal is to assess impact as accurately as possible and generate
meaningful solutions. For example, oral methods in local languages may have to be used instead
of written questionnaires in Vietnamese.
5.4. Revisiting the laws and regulations
Vietnamese regulations on consultation process still have limitations.
First, stakeholder consultation is still not adequate. According to the Decree 29/2011/ND-CP,
only 2 groups of stakeholders are required to be involved in the consultation process (People’s
Committee at commune level and representatives of local community that is directly affected by
the  project).  This  does  not  cover  other  stakeholders  that  might  be  relevant  such  as:
environmental/land/water management authorities at commune level or higher; entities involved
in environmental consultation; social/political groups in charge of ensuring that environment and
resources  benefit  the  people  within  their  scope  of  work;  media  working  in  project  areas;
international  or  regional  organizations;  individual  experts/scientists  and  citizens  willing  to
contribute to sustainable development.
Second, the responsibility of organizing stakeholder consultation meetings still belongs to the
local authorities instead of project owners. The People’s committee of the town is responsible for
announcing the summary of EIA to local people as well as organizing the consultation meeting
between stakeholders and project owners. This allocation of public consultation responsibility is
not  practical,  as  the  responsibility  for  the  whole  consultation  process  lies  with  the  project
owners.
Finally, the time period for consultation process is set at only 15 days. After that period, if there
is no response from the stakeholders in written form to the project owner, then it is considered
that there is no opposition to the project plans. Such a short amount of time is insufficient for
conducting a thorough consultation process.
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6. Summary and conclusion
Infrastructure  development  is  booming  in  Vietnam  despite  administrative  complexity  and
inefficiencies. Hydropower is likely to continue to be an important part of energy infrastructure
in  the  near  to  medium future.  Resettlement  for  hydropower  projects  has  become a  kind  of
lightning  rod  for  questions  of  environmental  justice  in  Vietnamese  society.  Impacts  from
displacement are not constant across populations: dams are built in mountainous areas and tend
to affect the poor disproportionately. Compensation is the key issue, overshadowing other social
impact considerations.
Funders rely on the information included in ESIA to make decisions about which projects get
approved. This can lead to an emphasis on the result --a report that looks good and omits issues--
over  the  process  --dealing  with  of  the  conflicts  at  hand.  Consultation  mechanisms  and
compensation  schemes  that  give  a  strong  voice  to  impacted  people  and  make  project
advancement  contingent  on  resolution  of  any  claims  are  an  important  part  of  managing
resettlements for sustainable outcomes. Dialogue alleviates the problem of dependent expertise.
New collaboration practices can improve the investment of all stakeholders in the assessment
process, from project owners to funders to impacted people, and lead to more robust decisions.
Finally, the potential conflict between people’s interests and preferences and those of developers
and  governments  is  not  easily  resolved.  ESIA is  not  an  insurance  policy.  But  ESIA,  done
thoroughly and thoughtfully, with real investment in ensuring sustainable livelihoods as a project
goal can go far in improving the status quo.
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Figure 1: The Srepok 4A project area. Buôn Đôn district, Đ k L k province, Central Highlandsắ ắ
region of Vietnam. March 2015. Colors enhanced (Strech 3D). Scale: the long leg of the canal is
11km. Landsat 8 image courtesy of the U.S. Geological Survey < http  ://  landsatlook  . usgs  . gov  / >,
accessed 2015-09-24
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